Monthly Tracking — January 2025 to April 2026
Average of Reuters/Ipsos, NBC News, Rasmussen, and YouGov right track/wrong track questions.
| Month | Right Track | Wrong Track | R Right Track | D Right Track | I Right Track | Key Event |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 2025 | 33% | 61% | 62% | 10% | 27% | Trump inauguration, initial optimism |
| Feb 2025 | 31% | 63% | 59% | 9% | 25% | DOGE cuts announced; market jitters |
| Mar 2025 | 29% | 65% | 55% | 8% | 23% | Tariff announcements begin |
| Apr 2025 | 28% | 66% | 52% | 8% | 22% | Liberation Day tariffs; market drop |
| May 2025 | 27% | 67% | 51% | 8% | 21% | Stock market partial recovery; inflation remains |
| Jun 2025 | 27% | 67% | 50% | 8% | 21% | Budget debate; debt ceiling |
| Jul 2025 | 26% | 68% | 48% | 8% | 20% | Medicaid cuts in reconciliation bill |
| Aug 2025 | 25% | 69% | 46% | 8% | 20% | Consumer confidence decline |
| Sep 2025 | 25% | 69% | 45% | 8% | 19% | Continued tariff impacts; job market stable |
| Oct 2025 | 25% | 70% | 44% | 8% | 19% | Midterm polling ramps up; voter discontent rising |
| Nov 2025 | 24% | 70% | 43% | 8% | 18% | First anniversary of DOGE; cuts debated |
| Dec 2025 | 25% | 69% | 43% | 8% | 18% | Holiday spending data; slight uptick |
| Jan 2026 | 24% | 70% | 41% | 8% | 18% | New year; new tariff escalations |
| Feb 2026 | 24% | 71% | 41% | 8% | 18% | Trade war expansion; EU retaliation |
| Mar 2026 | 23% | 72% | 40% | 8% | 18% | Recession fears peak |
| Apr 2026 | 24% | 71% | 40% | 8% | 18% | Slight stabilization; still historically low |
Right Track Trend 2017–2026
Partisan Breakdown — April 2026
Republicans
Down from 62% right track at inauguration. Republican satisfaction is declining as economic concerns mount, even within the base.
Democrats
Near-record low in-opposition right track. Consistent with historical pattern: the out-party is almost always deeply pessimistic about country direction.
Independents
The decisive number. 18% right track among independents is at the floor seen before historic wave elections. Down from 27% at inauguration.
Wrong Track & Midterm Seat Losses — Historical Correlation
Wrong track reading at 90 days before election (approx. August of midterm year) vs. actual seat changes.
| Midterm Year | Wrong Track (Aug) | House Seats Lost (Incumbent Party) | Senate Seats Lost | Key Driver | Pattern |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1994 | 64% | R +54 (D −54) | R +8 | Crime, healthcare failure, anti-Clinton | Large wrong track = large losses |
| 1998 | 44% | D +5 (R −5) | No change | Surplus, Clinton impeachment backlash | Low wrong track = incumbent holds |
| 2002 | 39% | R +8 (D −8) | R +2 | Post-9/11 rally, Iraq support | Low wrong track + rally = gains |
| 2006 | 61% | D +31 (R −31) | D +6 | Iraq, Katrina, corruption | High wrong track = wave |
| 2010 | 68% | R +63 (D −63) | R +6 | ACA, stimulus, Tea Party | Very high wrong track = wave |
| 2014 | 62% | R +13 (D −13) | R +9 | ISIS, Ebola, stagnation | High wrong track + low enthusiasm = losses |
| 2018 | 63% | D +41 (R −41) | R +2 | Anti-Trump, healthcare | Wrong track hit R House, helped R Senate (map) |
| 2022 | 65% | R +9 (D −9) | D +1 | Inflation, but abortion moderated | Wrong track did not produce full wave |
| 2026 (projection) | 71% (Apr) | R −15 to −30 projected | R +1 to +3 (map advantage) | Economy, healthcare, Medicaid | If pattern holds: significant R House losses |
Note: House outcome and Senate outcome can diverge when the map strongly favors one party. 2022 showed this: high wrong track hurt D House seats but the Senate majority protected D incumbents. In 2026, wrong track hurts R (the incumbent party) in the House; in the Senate, R benefits from defending only 12 seats vs D's 23.
Why 71% Wrong Track Matters
71% wrong track is severe. In the post-WWII era, only July 2008 (financial crisis, 76%), late 2011 (debt ceiling crisis, 73%), and early 2012 matched or exceeded this level. The current reading reflects compounded anxieties: tariff-driven inflation, healthcare threat perception, and partisan collapse of faith in national institutions under one-party rule.
The Independent Collapse
Independent wrong track at 82% is the metric most closely watched by campaign strategists. In 2010, when R's gained 63 House seats, independent wrong track peaked at 76%. The current 82% exceeds that level by 6 points. However, translating wrong track into votes depends on mobilization: will dissatisfied independents vote in a midterm at higher rates than in 2022?
Resilience Scenarios
Historical wrong track predicts losses for Republicans but three scenarios could moderate the wave: (1) A strong economic rebound by September 2026 could push right track above 30%, narrowing losses; (2) A major national security event could trigger a rally effect; (3) Democratic candidate quality failures in key districts could allow R incumbents to survive. None of these are base-case scenarios given current trends.
