Trump’s second term has fundamentally reshuffled EU–US relations. Tariffs, Ukraine, NATO and European defense autonomy — here is what European leaders are doing and what their citizens think.
On April 2, 2025 ("Liberation Day"), the Trump administration announced sweeping tariffs on EU goods — a baseline 10% on all imports, with sectoral tariffs targeting steel (25%), aluminum (25%) and automobiles (25%). The EU’s reaction was swift and unified. For full US polling on the tariffs, see Trade & Tariffs: What Americans Think.
The European Commission prepared retaliatory measures targeting approximately $28 billion in US goods — a carefully calibrated list designed to inflict political pain in Trump-supporting US states. Products targeted included Harley-Davidson motorcycles, Kentucky bourbon and Florida orange juice.
| EU Country | Oppose US Tariffs | Main Export at Risk |
|---|---|---|
| Germany | 71% | Automobiles (BMW, VW, Mercedes) |
| France | 68% | Wine, luxury goods, aerospace |
| Italy | 62% | Food products, industrial machinery |
| Netherlands | 66% | Chemicals, pharmaceuticals |
| Poland | 58% | Steel, manufactured goods |
| Hungary | 41% | Automotive parts (most Trump-friendly EU country) |
Trump’s signals of reduced US commitment to Ukraine forced a fundamental strategic rethink in European capitals. Rather than waiting for Washington, EU governments accelerated their own defense commitments.
President Macron raised the prospect of extending France’s nuclear deterrent to EU partners, a historic shift. He also proposed deploying European troops to Ukraine as peacekeepers. 54% of French support deeper EU military engagement.
Germany’s new government under Friedrich Merz approved a €100 billion+ special fund for military and security spending — a constitutional revision. 57% of Germans support increased defense spending (a historic high).
Poland is building the largest army in continental Europe, targeting 4% of GDP for defense. As Ukraine’s direct neighbor, Polish public opinion strongly backs Western support: 74% support continued Ukraine aid.
Orbán’s Hungary remains the sole EU member aligned with Trump’s framing on Ukraine. Hungary has blocked several EU aid packages. Only 31% of Hungarians support EU military aid to Ukraine.
Trump’s insistence that European NATO members “pay their share” has accelerated a debate that predates his presidency: should Europe build a defense capability independent of US leadership?
The EU’s ReArm Europe plan, unveiled in 2025, committed to mobilizing up to €800 billion for defense over four years. Multiple EU countries — Germany, Poland, Sweden, the Baltic states — announced defense budgets above 3% of GDP.
A key question: can EU defense replace US security guarantees? Most analysts say no in the short term — the US provides irreplaceable nuclear deterrence, intelligence sharing and logistical capacity. But the direction of travel has shifted permanently.
The theory that right-wing European governments (Meloni, Orbán) could serve as a bridge between the EU and Trump collapsed in April 2026 when Trump publicly attacked Pope Leo XIV — the first American pope — calling him "weak on crime." Italian Prime Minister Meloni, whose political brand rests in part on Catholic conservative identity, declared Trump's attack "unacceptable" and refused a US request to use the NATO base at Sigonella for Iran-related military operations. Trump responded by threatening to withdraw 12,000 US troops from Italy. Italian media — across the political spectrum — rallied behind Meloni.
The immediate consequence was a realignment: Meloni pivoted toward EU solidarity, joining a common front with German Chancellor Merz, French President Macron, and UK Prime Minister Starmer. The Sigonella standoff revealed the structural limits of the EU-MAGA alignment theory: European conservative leaders can maintain warm bilateral relations with Trump in periods of calm, but when US demands directly threaten national sovereignty — or, in Italy's case, the Vatican — the relationship cannot hold.
Hungary's Orbán remains the one exception. He has not criticized Trump over the Pope Leo XIV episode and continues to block EU joint positions on Russia and Ukraine. The Meloni-Trump rupture, however, removed the last major EU government that credibly positioned itself as a Trump ally. As of May 2026, every major EU government is in adversarial or tense relations with the Trump administration.
| Country | Leader | Trump Relations | Trump Trust (Public) | Key Stance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Germany | Merz (CDU) | Tense | 18% | Strong Ukraine support, EU defense push, resists tariffs |
| France | Macron (Renew) | Adversarial | 19% | Nuclear umbrella proposal, EU sovereignty push, bilateral outreach |
| Poland | Tusk (KO) | Mixed | 34% | Wants US troops to stay, supports Ukraine, pro-NATO spending |
| Hungary | Orbán (Fidesz) | Warm | 52% | Aligns with Trump on Ukraine, immigration; blocks EU unity |
| Italy | Meloni (FdI) | Broken | 29% | April 2026: Trump attacked Pope Leo XIV, Meloni refused US use of Sigonella, Trump threatened troop withdrawal; alliance collapsed |
| Denmark | Frederiksen (S) | Very Tense | 17% | Greenland threats have shocked Danish public; defense spending surge |
A Pew Research Center survey (Spring 2025) across 14 European countries found overwhelming distrust of Trump’s foreign policy judgment:
| Country | Trust Trump in World Affairs | Change vs. Biden Approval |
|---|---|---|
| Germany | 18% | −59 pts |
| France | 19% | −57 pts |
| Sweden | 21% | −54 pts |
| Netherlands | 24% | −51 pts |
| Spain | 20% | −56 pts |
| Poland | 34% | −40 pts |
| Italy | 29% | −46 pts |
| Hungary | 52% | +5 pts (Fidesz base) |
| EU average | 22% | −55 pts |
Defense spending, 2% target and Europe’s military buildup.
Compare public opinion on climate, democracy and media trust.
The rise of nationalist parties across Europe and their Trump connections.
67% of Americans oppose broad tariffs — the domestic polling behind the trade war.
How the trade war feeds into the 2026 midterm electoral calculus.
38.1% approve — the domestic approval context for Trump’s foreign policy.
April 2026: How Trump's attack on Pope Leo XIV ended the EU-MAGA bridge.
The Sondervermögen, NATO spending, and Merz's harder line against Trump.
