Electoral College Reform: NPV, Abolition, and Why Change Is Hard

The most powerful argument for Electoral College reform is the popular vote inversion problem. In 2000, Al Gore received 540,000 more votes than George W. Bush nationally but lost the Electoral College 266-271 (after the Supreme Court's ruling in Bush v. Gore). In 2016, Hillary Clinton received 2.87 million more votes than Donald Trump but lost the Electoral College 227-306.

Critics argue this means the president can be chosen by a minority of voters — that the winner does not reflect the national will. Defenders respond that the Electoral College was designed precisely so that presidents must build coalitions across states, not just run up large margins in a few heavily populated areas.

A second critique is the battleground state effect. Because most states are not competitive, candidates from both parties concentrate almost all of their campaign visits, advertising, and policy promises on a small number of swing states. In 2024, roughly 70% of campaign events were concentrated in seven states: Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, Arizona, Georgia, Nevada, and North Carolina. Voters in California, Texas, New York, and most other states receive virtually no direct candidate attention in the general election.

The small-state bias is more nuanced than often stated. Every state receives a minimum of three electoral votes (two senators plus at least one House member), which overweights small states on a per-capita basis. Wyoming has 3 electoral votes for approximately 580,000 residents — one electoral vote per 193,000 people. California has 54 electoral votes for 39 million residents — one electoral vote per 722,000 people. However, large swing states like Pennsylvania and Michigan actually receive disproportionate attention, complicating the picture.

Article II of the Constitution gives state legislatures plenary authority over how their electors are appointed. States currently use a winner-take-all method by custom, not constitutional requirement. Maine and Nebraska already allocate some electors by congressional district. The NPVIC exploits this flexibility.

Under the compact, member states agree to award all of their electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote — regardless of how their own state voted. If enough states join to total 270 electoral votes, every future presidential approval would effectively be decided by the national popular vote, because the compact states collectively hold a majority of electors.

The legal obstacles are significant. Article I of the Constitution requires congressional consent for interstate compacts that affect federal power — and whether NPVIC requires such consent is untested. Opponents argue it would require congressional approval, which it is unlikely to receive. Supporters argue it falls within a state's existing authority to manage its own electors without federal permission.

The political obstacle is equally clear: all current NPVIC members are Democratic-leaning states. The compact would need buy-in from purple or Republican-leaning states to reach 270 electoral votes — and no Republican-controlled legislature has shown interest, since Republicans have benefited from the Electoral College in both 2000 and 2016.

Abolishing or restructuring the Electoral College via constitutional amendment requires two-thirds of both chambers of Congress (290 House votes, 67 Senate votes) and then ratification by 38 state legislatures. The amendment process is intentionally designed to require broad supermajority consensus.

No Electoral College abolition amendment has ever passed either chamber of Congress. The closest attempt came in 1969-1970, when the House passed the Bayh-Celler amendment (which would have replaced the Electoral College with a direct popular vote) 339-70 — comfortably above the two-thirds threshold. The Senate filibustered it. Southern senators who opposed civil rights legislation viewed the direct popular vote as a threat to their political power, and enough Republicans joined to prevent cloture.

The structural problem is that small states and Republican-leaning states have no incentive to ratify an amendment that eliminates their Electoral College advantage. Even if Congress passed an amendment, 13 states can block ratification. There are well over 13 states that benefit from the current system and reliably vote Republican at the presidential level.

A more incremental amendment approach — such as eliminating the faithless elector possibility or moving to congressional district allocation nationally — would face different political coalitions but is equally untested.

Congressional District Method — Maine and Nebraska already allocate their electoral votes by congressional district: two electors go to the statewide winner, and one goes to the winner of each congressional district. In 2020, Nebraska's 2nd district (Omaha) went to Biden; in 2024, Maine's 2nd district (rural north) went to Trump. A national move to this system would increase the role of gerrymandering in presidential elections — the party that draws House maps would gain a direct advantage in presidential contests.

Proportional Allocation by State — Rather than winner-take-all, states would award electoral votes proportionally to each candidate's vote share. A candidate winning 55% of a state's popular vote would receive 55% of its electors. This would produce more representative outcomes but would dramatically increase the likelihood of no candidate reaching 270 electoral votes, throwing elections to the House of Representatives.

Expanding the House — Because the Electoral College is based partly on House representation, expanding the House (currently capped at 435 since 1929) would reduce the relative weight of the two-senator minimum and make the Electoral College slightly more proportional to population. The Washington DC Admissions Act and various House expansion proposals have proposed adding seats, but none have advanced.