- Goldman Sachs projects a net loss of 400,000 U.S. jobs from the full 2026 tariff regime — steel/aluminum gain +65K jobs but auto, agriculture, retail, and construction losses far exceed gains.
- Auto parts costs have risen an estimated 18%, with Big Three automakers (Ford, GM, Stellantis) estimating $2,000–$4,000 per-vehicle cost increases — directly threatening UAW workers in Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana.
- Agricultural workers face export retaliation from China, Mexico, and Canada — the 2.4M-person sector that produces in key swing states Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Nebraska.
- Yale Budget Lab estimates the average American household faces $1,900 in annual additional costs from the tariff program — a regressive cost that hits lower-income households hardest.
Sector-by-Sector Impact: Who Gains, Who Loses
| Sector | Workers Affected | Tariff Impact | Net Direction | Key States |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Steel Production | ~140,000 direct | 25% on imports = domestic pricing power | Positive | PA, OH, IN, MI, AL |
| Aluminum Production | ~60,000 direct | 25% on imports = domestic demand up | Positive | KY, WA, TX, TN |
| Auto Manufacturing | ~1M direct (UAW+) | Parts costs up 18%; demand suppressed | Negative | MI, OH, IN, TN, KY |
| Agricultural / Farm | ~2.4M direct | Export retaliation from China, Mexico, Canada | Negative | IA, IL, MN, WI, NE, KS |
| Retail / Distribution | ~16M direct | Import cost increases passed to consumers; demand softens | Negative | All states; FL, TX, CA heaviest |
| Construction | ~8M direct | Steel/aluminum costs raise project budgets; materials inflation | Mildly Negative | TX, FL, CA, AZ, NY |
| Semiconductor / Tech Mfg | ~300,000 direct | Supply chain disruption; China retaliation risk on exports | Mixed | AZ, OR, TX, OH |
| Domestic Appliances | ~100,000 direct | Some protection from Chinese competition | Mildly Positive | TN, SC, OH |
The Auto Worker Dilemma: Supported Trump, Now Facing the Consequences
The political irony of the auto worker tariff situation is acute. UAW members in Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana voted for Trump in significant numbers in 2024 — attracted by his trade protection rhetoric and skepticism of Biden-era EV mandates that the union viewed as threatening internal combustion engine production jobs. Trump's explicit framing of tariffs as protecting American auto workers resonated with a constituency that had watched production and employment decline over decades of offshore sourcing.
The specific tariff design, however, produces a different outcome than the rhetoric suggested. The 25% tariffs on Canadian and Mexican goods — including auto components — directly increase costs for the plants where UAW members work. Ford's River Rouge complex, GM's Flint plants, and Stellantis's Sterling Heights facilities — all in Michigan — source components from the integrated North American supply chain. When that supply chain becomes 18-25% more expensive overnight, the competitive position of those plants changes: vehicles become more expensive relative to substitutes, demand falls, and production volume decisions become less favorable. The UAW has not formally opposed the tariff program but has raised concerns about the supply chain impact in communications with the administration.
The Goldman Sachs Projection: What the -400,000 Figure Actually Measures
Goldman Sachs's projection of approximately 400,000 net job losses from the full tariff regime is the most cited independent economic analysis of the employment impact. The methodology models job gains in protected sectors (steel, aluminum, some manufacturing), job losses from higher input costs reducing employment in downstream manufacturing, job losses from higher consumer prices reducing household discretionary spending (which flows back to retail and service sector employment), and job losses from retaliatory tariffs on US export sectors — primarily agriculture and high-value manufactured goods.
The projection is contested by the Trump administration, which points to the tariff revenue as partially funding the 2025 tax cut extension and argues that reshoring investment — companies moving production to the US to avoid tariffs — will generate employment that the Goldman model underestimates. This reshoring argument has empirical support in isolated cases: TSMC's Arizona expansion, some pharmaceutical manufacturing repatriation, and a few steel-consuming manufacturers who have announced domestic capacity investments. Whether these investments aggregate to a number that offsets the broader employment drag is the core empirical question, and the answer will not be fully visible before the November 2026 elections. Partial data through Q3 2026 will be the relevant economic signal for voters.
Nucor, the largest US steel producer, announced expansion plans and hiring in steel-producing states. These real, visible job gains provide the political narrative for tariff supporters even as the net math favors job losses broadly.
Walmart, the largest private employer in the US, has warned investors of price increases on imported goods categories. Store-level price increases are the most politically visible effect of tariffs — directly hitting voters at the checkout line before any employment impact is felt.
China's 2018-era retaliatory tariffs cost US soybean farmers an estimated $8-12B in export revenue over two years. A similar or larger retaliation in 2026 would directly hit Iowa, Illinois, and Wisconsin farm income — states with competitive Senate races.
