Russia's war in Ukraine and Trump's NATO skepticism have triggered Europe's biggest defense spending surge since the Cold War. What do citizens support — and who is blocking it?
| Question | Support / Yes | Oppose / No |
|---|---|---|
| EU should increase defense spending | 64% | 26% |
| EU should develop independent defense capacity (less reliance on US) | 72% | 19% |
| Continue military support for Ukraine | 61% | 29% |
| EU joint defense bonds / common borrowing for defense | 53% | 32% |
| Russia poses a military threat to EU | 68% | 23% |
| NATO is important for EU security | 78% | 14% |
Sources: Eurobarometer, ECFR poll of polls, various 2024-2025. EU-27 weighted averages.
| Country | Support Higher Defense Spending | Current Defense % GDP |
|---|---|---|
| Poland | 85% | 4.0% |
| Finland | 82% | 2.4% |
| Estonia / Latvia / Lithuania | 80%+ | 2.5-3.4% |
| Sweden | 74% | 2.3% |
| Germany | 68% | 2.1% |
| France | 63% | 2.0% |
| Italy | 51% | 1.5% |
| Hungary | 44% | 2.1% |
| Austria | 42% | 0.8% (neutral) |
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 ended the post-Cold War security dividend that most European governments had relied upon since 1991. Three decades of declining defense budgets — the "peace dividend" — were abruptly reversed. Germany's Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared a "Zeitenwende" (turning point) within days of the invasion, pledging €100 billion for the Bundeswehr. Finland and Sweden joined NATO in 2023-2024. Poland surged to 4% of GDP in defense spending, the highest in NATO. The Baltic states, which share borders with Russia or Belarus, have consistently demanded both higher NATO troop deployments and a more aggressive EU response to Russian aggression.
The return of Donald Trump to the White House in January 2025 amplified European defense anxiety. Trump's remarks questioning whether the US would defend NATO allies who failed to meet spending targets — including a widely reported comment that he would "encourage" Russia to attack non-paying members — created a political crisis in European capitals. The European Commission responded in March 2025 with the ReArm Europe initiative: a €800 billion defense investment plan over four years, combining joint EU borrowing (SAFE instrument), relaxed national deficit rules for defense, and EIB financing. Commission President von der Leyen framed it as the EU's step toward "strategic autonomy" — the capacity to defend itself without depending on US commitments whose reliability had become uncertain.
The ReArm Europe plan faces significant internal opposition. Hungary under Viktor Orbán and Slovakia under Robert Fico have argued against EU joint borrowing for defense, echoing concerns about pooling sovereignty for military purposes. Austria's neutrality makes it constitutionally unable to participate in certain NATO-linked structures. The political divide in the European Parliament between pro-defense (EPP, S&D, Renew, ECR) and anti-defense blocs (ID, Patriots) broadly mirrors the broader EU political cleavage over Ukraine and Russia relations. Public opinion, however, has moved decisively in favor of higher defense spending — with even traditionally pacifist Germany now showing majority support for meeting and exceeding NATO's 2% target.
Security Action for Europe — EU joint borrowing for defense procurement. Allows member states to co-purchase munitions, air defense, and equipment at scale. Contested by Hungary and others.
European Defence Industry Programme — supports joint R&D in defense technology, reduces EU's dependence on non-EU suppliers, and builds the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base.
Off-budget mechanism funding weapons and ammunition deliveries to Ukraine. Over €10 billion committed since 2022. Contested by Hungary, which has blocked several tranches.
ReArm Europe (March 2025) proposes mobilizing €800 billion for EU defense via joint EU borrowing (SAFE), relaxed national deficit rules, and EIB financing. It aims to reduce EU dependence on US security guarantees and accelerate rearmament post-Ukraine. Hungary and Slovakia oppose joint borrowing elements.
Yes — 64% EU-wide, rising to 80-85% in Poland and the Baltics. Support surged after Russia's 2022 Ukraine invasion. Resistance is highest in Austria (neutral), Hungary (pro-Russia government), and Italy. Even in Germany, historically pacifist, majority support for exceeding NATO's 2% target has emerged by 2024-2025.
NATO's 2% GDP spending guideline has been a major transatlantic flashpoint under Trump. By 2024, 23 of 32 allies met the target (up from 3 in 2017). Trump has demanded 3-5% and threatened to reduce US commitments. This is the primary driver of the EU's push toward defense self-sufficiency and the ReArm Europe initiative.
